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Background
During the 1972 through 1993 influenza seasons in the United States, an average of 20,000
deaths and more than 100,000 hospitalizations each year resulted from complications of influenza
infection.1  Control of influenza in the general population is based on annual fall vaccination
programs, along with education about disease risk reduction, and on administration of antiviral
agents for treatment or prophylaxis.  Special vaccination programs traditionally have targeted
certain groups of individuals (e.g., those most likely to experience complications or to transmit
influenza to persons at high risk for complications).  However, influenza vaccination also may
have substantial health-related and economic benefits for healthy, working adults.2  In institutional
settings or other semi-enclosed environments, these control measures are supplemented with
surveillance activities, outbreak investigations, and monitoring the results of interventions.1
Although influenza has been reported on cruise ships in the past, seldom have prospective control
measures interrupting influenza transmission been reported.3,4,5  In late summer 1997, an influenza
outbreak among elderly passengers at high risk for complications from influenza and crew
members was investigated on board a cruise ship.  Disease transmission was successfully
interrupted by instituting surveillance, cohorting ill persons, vaccinating crew members, and
initiating antiviral chemoprophylaxis of both crew members and passengers.  Although this voyage
took place in the northern hemisphere during the summer, influenza A likely was introduced on
board the ship by travelers from the southern hemisphere, where influenza activity was in season. 
As service providers to passengers, crew members served as a reservoir for influenza infection
and transmitted disease to passengers on subsequent cruises.6  In summer 1998, a large influenza
A outbreak among travelers (including cruise ship passengers) and tourist industry workers
occurred in Alaska and the Yukon Territory.  Public health agencies identified the outbreak after
they were alerted about increased respiratory illness and pneumonia activity by cruise line
operators and by passengers who became ill after returning home.  In contrast to the 1997
outbreak, it was not possible to control this outbreak because it had already become widespread
among land and sea travelers.  Cases of illness among tourists to Alaska abated only after the
tourist season ended and tour operators and cruise ships left the region.7,8
Such summertime outbreaks among travelers and crew members on cruise ships suggest that
traveling in large groups may pose a risk for exposure to influenza viruses in regions of the world
where influenza is not in seasonal circulation, particularly if the group contains travelers from
areas of the world where influenza viruses are in seasonal circulation.  Reported utbreaks
highlight the need to develop criteria for determining when an outbreak is occurring and for
effective surveillance protocols so that early, targeted prevention efforts may be instituted. 
Efforts aimed at prevention and control of respiratory diseases, in particular of influenza, among
travelers and tourist industry workers should focus on key travel destinations that serve both as a
conduit and gathering point for travelers, where disease amplification may occur.  Cruise ships are
an example of this type of unique environment.
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The following preliminary guidelines for the prevention and control of influenza-like illness among
passengers and crew members on cruise ships were developed by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention based on many years of experience in controlling influenza outbreaks in nursing
homes and on the experience with travel-related influenza outbreak investigations in 1997 and
1998.  While more work is needed to determine the epidemiology of influenza among travelers,
these preliminary guidelines are intended to provide a practical approach for influenza prevention
and control measures on board cruise ships.
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Surveillance, Prevention and Control
of Influenza-Like Illness on Cruise Ships
General Considerations
1.  Medical staff of cruise ships should routinely be educated about the clinical, diagnostic and
treatment aspects of respiratory illnesses and their surveillance, prevention, and control, with
particular focus on influenza and pneumonia.
2.  A routine annual vaccination program for all crew members should be considered.  Presently,
no scientific data support or refute the usefulness of administering influenza vaccine more than
once a year to healthy adults.
3.  Medical staff on cruise ships with itineraries longer than 3 days should conduct passive year-
round surveillance for respiratory illnesses among passengers and crew members.  This type of
surveillance, in which respiratory illness reports are not actively sought, should count the number
of passengers and crew members presenting to the ship’s infirmary with respiratory illness.
4.  In the event of a respiratory illness outbreak, medical staff may not be able to rapidly obtain
diagnostic testing kits and medical supplies, including antiviral agents (e.g., amantadine,
rimantadine).  Therefore, ships should be provisioned year-round with sufficient supplies to
respond to an outbreak.  All ships should regularly stock diagnostic supplies sufficient to test at
least 50-100 persons for influenza (rapid viral antigen detection kits) and 20 persons for legionella
(urine antigen testing).
Surveillance Characteristics (Appendices A and B)
1.  Surveillance activities consist of the following components:
A. knowing who is providing data,
B. collecting and tabulating them,
C. analyzing and interpreting them, and
D. disseminating results to those who need to know so that appropriate action may be
taken if necessary.
2.  A single cruise line company medical surveillance coordinator, with assistance from other
medical staff members, should be responsible for overseeing the ongoing surveillance program at
the level of the cruise line company.  The surveillance coordinator’s name and contact information
should be provided to and kept updated with the Division of Quarantine, CDC, at telephone (404)
639-8100.  Also, a single medical staff member should be assigned to each ship to oversee each
ship’s surveillance program and report regularly to the company medical surveillance coordinator.
-4-
3.  Current surveillance procedures for respiratory illness should be evaluated and, if necessary,
updated to incorporate the following components:
A. Data collection and review
1. Surveillance data should be collected by using a standardized form
during all commercial operating times.
2. Data that are collected should include, at a minimum:  patient age
and sex, onset date of respiratory symptoms, respiratory symptoms
(cough, sore throat, fever or feverishness/chills), and results of
diagnostic testing (e.g., rapid viral and bacterial tests, chest x-ray).
3. Data should be routinely reviewed to assess trends in disease
frequency.  Ships’ medical officers should consider reviewing these
data at least every 3 days.
B. Case definitions
1. Non-febrile acute respiratory illness (nfARI):  cough or sore throat
AND no measured fever $100.0EF ($37.8EC) or self-reported
feverishness/chills
2. Influenza-like illness (ILI):  cough or sore throat AND measured
fever $100.0EF ($37.8EC) or self-reported feverishness/chills
3. Acute respiratory illness (ARI):  cough or sore throat
Note:  ARI includes both nfARI and ILI case definitions.
4. Pneumonia
i.  Suspect:  cough or sore throat AND clinical signs of pneumonia
ii.  Confirmed:  cough or sore throat AND chest x-ray evidence of
pneumonia
Note:  If a patient is taken off a ship because of pneumonia,
the cruise line should follow up with the treating medical
facility and should document the disease etiology in the
ships’ medical log and/or surveillance records.  An
investigation may be warranted if Legionnaires’ disease is
diagnosed (refer to #4B below).
C. Sample data forms for influenza-like illness (Appendices A and B)
1. All fields should be completed, with nothing left blank.
2. Dates should be entered by using international nomenclature (i.e.,
day/month/year).
3. Date on and off ship refers to when a passenger or crew member
first boarded the ship and when they disembarked (i.e., at the end of
the cruise or medically evacuated).
4. Using case definitions
i.  nfARI and ILI.  Only one case definition should be entered per
patient visit (i.e., either nfARI or ILI should be entered).  The most
specific case definition should be recorded.
ii.  Pneumonia.  In addition to recording nfARI and ILI for each
patient visit, pneumonia should be entered as either suspect (Pn-S)
-5-
or confirmed (Pn-C), if applicable.
iii.  ARI.  This category should be used to assess the magnitude of
illness on board ship (see Potential Outbreak of Influenza A: 
Preliminary Alaska region-specific threshold levels).  It includes
persons meeting either the nfARI or ILI case definitions.
5. Rapid viral testing categories are:
i.  test not done (ND),
ii.  positive result (P), and
iii.  negative result (N).
6. Chest x-ray (CXR) field categories are:
i.  test not done (ND),
ii.  positive result (P), meaning that an infiltrate is present, and
iii.  negative result (N), meaning that no infiltrate is present.
7. The comment field should include information and results for any
other testing (even if results are negative), whether another
etiologic agent has been identified, and the diagnosis.
D. Timely reporting of surveillance information to appropriate authorities.
1. Routine surveillance data (i.e., data thought to reflect a baseline
incidence of ARI and ILI) should be reported to the cruise line
medical representative (e.g., medical director’s office).  Routine
reporting of surveillance data to national public health agencies
such as CDC or Health Canada is not expected or required, except
as stipulated in Section 71.21 of Title 42 of the U.S. Public Health
Service Act (42CFR71).  Instead, these routine data should be used
internally by cruise line operators to better understand the patterns
of ARI and ILI among their passengers and crew members.  CDC
can provide consultation for interpreting surveillance data, if
requested.
2. If an outbreak is suspected, surveillance data should be rapidly
reported to the cruise line medical representative (e.g., medical
director’s office) and a national public health agency (e.g., CDC or
Health Canada, where applicable).  The Division of Quarantine
(DQ) at CDC will notify appropriate state and local health officials
and consult with appropriate disease-specific experts within CDC. 
Because cruise ship passengers typically return to various U.S.
states and countries after their cruise, which usually takes place in
international waters, DQ also will notify appropriate international
health agencies.
4.  Each vessel’s medical clinic should include the following minimum diagnostic capabilities:
A. Rapid viral antigen detection kits for influenza.  Commercially available rapid
detection kits in the United States detect both influenza A and B viruses but do not
differentiate between them (for therapeutic implications, see
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Recommendations for Interrupting Influenza Outbreaks on Cruise Ships:  
Confirming an Influenza Outbreak).  Each ship should have a plan for performing
selected viral cultures if an influenza outbreak is suspected.
B. Urine antigen testing for Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1.  All persons with
suspect and confirmed pneumonia should have a chest x-ray performed, and all
confirmed cases of pneumonia should at least be tested for legionellosis.  If a
legionella test is positive, an investigation may be warranted to identify the source
and take appropriate corrective measures to prevent additional cases because this
pathogen likely is spread from a contaminated environmental water source.9,10 All
confirmed cases of legionellosis should be reported to the cruise line medical
representative and if appropriate, to national public health agencies (e.g., CDC or
Health Canada).
Potential Outbreak of Influenza A (Appendices C, D and E)
1.  An outbreak is defined as the occurrence of more cases of disease than expected (higher than
an established baseline) occurring in a specific group of people over a particular period of time in
a particular place.  To define an influenza outbreak, systematic region-specific surveillance should
be performed and baseline illness levels determined (see below).
2.  Levels of respiratory illness suggestive of an influenza outbreak
A. No rigorously confirmed region-specific threshold levels yet exist to determine
when an influenza outbreak is occurring on a cruise ship.  While knowledge of
these levels is critical, they can be determined only through the systematic
collection of surveillance data (ARI and ILI) by individual cruise lines.
B. Preliminary Alaska region-specific (regional waters of Alaska, British Columbia,
and Washington State) threshold levels for passenger illness are proposed based on
data gathered during the 1998 Alaska influenza outbreak investigation, which
documented high numbers of cases of influenza illness compared with the 1997
summer season.  These levels are based on:
1. the number of passengers meeting the ARI and ILI case definitions,
2. the total number of passengers on board for a given cruise, and 
3. the cruise duration.
C. Threshold levels for illness among crew members, similar to that proposed for
passengers, cannot be calculated because data are lacking at this time.
3.  Preliminary Alaska region-specific (regional waters of Alaska, British Columbia, and
Washington State) threshold levels
A. As best can be determined at this time, the proposed preliminary threshold levels
will enable ships’ medical officers to determine if an influenza outbreak of
magnitude comparable with that of the 1998 Alaska outbreak is occurring by 
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identifying when cases of ARI are approaching 1998 Alaskan outbreak levels. 
Reaching these threshold levels may require implementation of enhanced
surveillance measures and possibly intervention and control measures.
B. Preliminary threshold levels are based on a 2-year assessment of cases of ARI and
ILI during the 1997 and 1998 summer tourist seasons in Alaska.  Therefore, these
levels should be interpreted with caution because of the following limitations:
1. Baseline levels of ARI and ILI have not been rigorously studied. 
Summer 1997 was assumed to reflect baseline levels of respiratory
illnesses, and summer 1998 to reflect an outbreak year with
abnormally high numbers of respiratory illness.
2. Seasonal patterns of ARI and ILI (e.g., summer versus winter) may
differ.
3. Preliminary threshold levels may underestimate illness because
cases of ARI and ILI may reflect medical care-seeking behavior
(i.e., older persons may be more likely to seek medical attention
than younger persons).  Therefore, it is likely that these preliminary
threshold levels will not detect all respiratory disease outbreaks.
4.  Using and interpreting Alaska region-specific ARI and ILI threshold-level graphs
(Appendices C, D and E)
A. Threshold-level graphs have been calculated by using data from a subset of ships
sailing in Alaskan waters in 1998.  The majority of these ships carried over 1,000
passengers; therefore, threshold levels can only accurately be extrapolated to ships
carrying $600 passengers.
B. Use of these graphs should not be restricted to assessing the cumulative number of
passengers with ARI or ILI at the end of each cruise.  More importantly, they
should be used to assess the cumulative number of passengers with ARI or ILI
during each cruise.
Note:  The ARI case definition includes all persons who meet either the
nfARI or ILI case definitions.
C. ARI threshold levels by day of cruise – Alaska region (Appendix C)
1. Determine the total number of passengers on the cruise (horizontal
axis).
2. Determine the day of the cruise (right side of graph).
3. On the graph, plot the point of intersection of the total number of
passengers on the cruise and the line indicating the cumulative
number of passengers with ARI by day of cruise, for the cruise day
of interest.
4. Read the number of passengers with ARI on the left vertical axis.
Note:  This is the minimum level of cases at which active
surveillance for cases of ILI should be initiated and
consideration given to selectively using rapid viral antigen
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detection kits to rule out influenza.  During an influenza
outbreak, data have shown that cases of ARI are good
markers for cases of ILI.
D. ILI threshold levels by day of cruise – Alaska region (Appendix D)
1. Determine the total number of passengers on the cruise (horizontal
axis).
2. Determine the day of the cruise (right side of graph).
3. On the graph, plot the point of intersection of the total number of
passengers on the cruise and the line indicating the cumulative
number of passengers with ILI by day of cruise, for the cruise day
of interest.
4. Read the number of passengers with ILI on the left vertical axis.
Note:  This is the level at or above which an influenza
outbreak is likely occurring.  Rapid viral antigen detection
kits should be used for diagnosis and outbreak
confirmation.
E. Example of ARI threshold levels by day of cruise for a 21-day cruise 
(Appendix E)
1. Total number of passengers on the cruise:  1500
2. Day of cruise:  10
3. See the dotted black line on the example graph
4. The number of passengers with ARI:  47
Interpretation:  If on day 10 of a 21-day cruise, at least 47
passengers meet the case definition for ARI, then an
outbreak of influenza should be suspected and active
surveillance for cases of ILI initiated.  Selective use of rapid
viral antigen detection kits to rule out influenza infection
also should be considered at this time.
5.  Suspected influenza outbreak
Refer to the recommendations for interrupting influenza outbreaks on cruise ships.
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Recommendations for Interrupting Influenza Outbreaks
on Cruise Ships
Keys to Successful Management and Control of Influenza Outbreaks
1.  Early recognition of an outbreak (the occurrence of more cases of disease than expected
among a specific group of people over a particular period of time in a particular place).
2.  Rapid laboratory diagnosis.
3.  Prompt institution of control measures, including the use of antiviral medications for influenza
A infection.
Confirming an Influenza Outbreak
1.  Once an outbreak of influenza is suspected based on ARI and ILI threshold levels, rapid viral
diagnostic testing for influenza and for other respiratory viruses should be performed to ascertain
the disease etiology and confirm an influenza outbreak.  Rapid influenza diagnostic tests have a
higher yield if utilized within 4 days of symptom onset.
In the United States, commercially available rapid influenza diagnostic tests either do
not differentiate between influenza A and B viruses (e.g., ZstatFlu® [ZymeTx], Flu OIA®
[Biostar])* or detect only influenza A virus (e.g., Directigen Flu A® [Becton
Dickinson])*.
A.  Implications for antiviral therapy
1. Currently available antiviral agents (i.e., amantadine and
rimantadine) interfere only with the replication cycle of influenza A
but not influenza B, and therefore are useful only in the treatment
and prophylaxis of influenza A infections.
2. Neuraminidase inhibitors, a class of antiviral agents with activity
against both influenza A and B viruses, are being tested for
licensure in the United States but are not yet available.  When these
medications will become available is uncertain; however, when they
do become available, differentiation between the two influenza
viruses may no longer be necessary for purposes of treatment and
prophylaxis with this class of agents.  Nonetheless, viral cultures
should still be performed to assess specific influenza strains for
vaccine match purposes (see below).
*Use of product names are for identification purposes only and do not constitute or imply endorsement by
the United States government, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or any of its organizational
units or employees.
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3. If the etiologic agent causing disease is unknown, antiviral
medication should not be used because of the potential side effects
associated with these medications.  Efforts should be made to
determine the cause of disease.
2.  Each ship should have a plan for performing viral cultures on selected patients if an influenza
outbreak is confirmed by rapid viral diagnostic testing or if the disease etiology remains 
unknown.
Recommendations for Passengers and Crew Members
1.  Outbreak notification and education about influenza
A. Once an influenza outbreak has been identified, passengers and crew members
should be notified of their potential risk of exposure to influenza.
B. Passengers and crew members should be educated about the symptoms and signs
of disease, complications of infection, groups at high risk for complications, and
prophylactic and therapeutic options for influenza A infection.  This may be
accomplished by distributing fact sheets about influenza and/or offering group
counseling sessions.
C. Passengers and crew members should be encouraged to report to the ships’
infirmary if they have symptoms and signs of respiratory illness.
2.  Active surveillance (surveillance for which respiratory illness reports are actively solicited)
A. Active surveillance among passengers and crew members should be initiated by
ship’s medical staff to detect new cases of respiratory illness once an influenza
outbreak has been identified.  Established case definitions for ARI, ILI and
pneumonia should be used, and the date active surveillance was initiated should be
recorded.
B. Active surveillance should include directly contacting passengers (e.g., passenger
surveys) and crew members (see Additional Recommendations Specific for Crew
Members:  Active Surveillance) to assess whether they have symptoms and signs
of respiratory illness.  These symptoms include cough, sore throat, and fever or
self-reported feverishness/chills.
C. Using established ARI, ILI and pneumonia case definitions, the designated medical
staff person responsible for ongoing surveillance should review medical log data
for both passengers and crew members daily to evaluate illness trends and to
initiate or assess control measures.
D. Daily case counts should be reported to the cruise line medical representative (e.g.,
medical director’s office).
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3.  Antiviral medication (e.g., amantadine and rimantadine) for confirmed influenza A outbreaks
A.  Treatment
1. Ill passengers and crew members who are at highest risk for
complications should receive priority (refer to “1999
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices [ACIP]:  Prevention and Control of Influenza” for risk
determination1).  They should be advised of the benefits of therapy
in reducing the risk for serious complications and counseled on the
potential side effects of antiviral medication.
2. Other ill passengers and crew members.
B.  Chemoprophylaxis, in descending order of priority
If supplies of antiviral agents are limited, these medications should be offered and
dispensed, barring medical contraindications, in the following order of priority:
1. Close contacts of ill passengers and crew members (i.e., those
sharing a cabin), particularly those at increased risk for infection
and complications.  They should be advised of the benefits of
prophylaxis (preventing illness and possibly reducing the risk of
further transmission of infection) and counseled on the potential 
side effects of antiviral medication.
2. Other close contacts of ill persons (i.e., those sharing group
activities such as meals and travel excursions).
3. Passengers and crew members who are at increased risk for
complications of influenza, regardless of vaccination status, but
who are not close contacts of ill persons.
4. All other crew members.
5. All other passengers (depending on circumstances).
Additional Recommendations Specific for Crew Members
1.  Active surveillance (surveillance for which respiratory illness reports are actively solicited)
A. Active surveillance for new cases among crew members should be conducted by
supervisors during the affected cruise and continued during the next cruise (up to
21 days following initiation of interventions).
B. Crew members should be asked daily if they have any symptoms of respiratory
illness (i.e., cough, sore throat, and fever or self-reported feverishness/chills).  
Crew members who have symptoms suggestive of a respiratory illness should
report to the ship’s infirmary for further medical evaluation.
2.  Isolating/cohorting ill crew members
A. All crew members with respiratory illness (ILI or confirmed influenza) should be
isolated from non-infected crew members and passengers.  Isolation or cohorting,
which limits the spread of infection, consists of confinement to a cabin alone or
with another ill crew member for at least 5 days after symptom onset.
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B. Contact with infected crew members should be strictly limited to influenza-
vaccinated or recovered persons (no visitors); meals and other items should be
brought to their cabins by influenza-vaccinated or recovered persons only.
C. If the above-described isolation procedure is not feasible due to space or logistic
constraints, off-ship isolation measures (e.g., placing affected crew members in a
hotel and cohorting them in a manner similar to that described on board ship [refer
to #2A and B above]) should be considered.
3.  Influenza vaccination
All crew members who are not ill and have no contraindication to vaccination should be
offered immunization if they have not been vaccinated within the past year during a
routine annual vaccination program.  Protective immunity can be expected within 2 weeks
of vaccination and can decrease influenza-associated morbidity.  Cruise lines should
attempt to achieve the highest vaccination levels possible; however, they should aim for at
least an 80% vaccination rate among crew members.  Presently, no scientific data support
or refute the usefulness of administering influenza vaccine more than once a year to
healthy adults.
4.  Chemoprophylaxis
A. Crew members who were not vaccinated at least 2 weeks prior to the institution of
chemoprophylaxis should complete the entire recommended 2-week course of
chemoprophylaxis with antiviral agents to interrupt influenza A transmission. 
Prophylaxis should be considered for all crew members, regardless of their
vaccination status, if the outbreak is caused by a variant strain of influenza A that
might not be prevented by the vaccine.  This highlights the need for using viral
cultures as part of laboratory testing during an outbreak to determine vaccine and
outbreak strain relatedness.
B. If a crew member with unique technical responsibilities could potentially jeopardize
the safe operation of a ship by experiencing neurologic side effects from
chemoprophylactic agents while on duty, the risks of prophylaxis may outweigh
the benefits.  If this crew member continues to work, interaction with other crew
members and passengers should be limited as much as possible to avoid potential
disease transmission.
5.  Crew transfers
A. If a variant strain of influenza A not controlled by the vaccine is circulating, crew
members should not be transferred to other ships from a cruise experiencing
influenza transmission until after they have completed 2 weeks of antiviral
chemoprophylaxis, regardless of their vaccination status.
B. In an outbreak setting, any crew members joining the ship for the next cruise
should be vaccinated with influenza vaccine (refer to #3 above) and placed on
chemoprophylaxis for 2 weeks.
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Additional Recommendations Specific for Passengers
1.  Isolating/cohorting ill passengers
All passengers suspected to be infected with influenza should be encouraged to limit their
activities to prevent further spread of influenza among non-infected passengers and crew
members.  Isolating ill passengers in a similar manner to that described for crew members,
while preferred, may not be feasible.
2.  Newly embarking passengers
A. Prior to embarkation on a subsequent cruise, new passengers should be notified of
an influenza outbreak during the previous cruise.  They should be provided
information on the status of the outbreak and measures taken to prevent
transmission and treat influenza infection.
B. Chemoprophylaxis is not recommended for new passengers if the number of
respiratory illnesses among crew members has declined or stabilized following
chemoprophylaxis and if all crew members have been immunized for
influenza.  However, passengers in high-risk categories should be advised to
consult with the ship’s doctor regarding available chemoprophylaxis.
-14-
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APPENDIX C
* Includes regional waters of Alaska, British Columbia, and Washington State
Preliminary ARI Threshold Levels by Day of Cruise -- Alaska Region* 
(rate 3.078 per 1000 passenger days, 1998)
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APPENDIX D
* Includes regional waters of Alaska, British Columbia, and Washington State
Preliminary ILI Threshold Levels by Day of Cruise -- Alaska Region* 
(rate 1.380 per 1000 passenger days, 1998)
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APPENDIX E
Example:  Use of ARI Threshold Levels by Day of Cruise 
(rate 3.078 per 1000 passenger days, 1998)
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